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Abstract
The belief that both the behavior and outcomes of students are aﬀected
by their peers is important in shaping education policy. I analyze two polar
education systems -tracking and mixing- and propose several criteria for their
comparison. I ﬁnd that tracking is the system that maximizes average hu-
man capital in societies where the distribution of pre-school achievement is not
very dispersed. I also ﬁnd that when peer eﬀects and individuals’ pre-school
achievement are close substitutes, all risk averse individuals prefer mixing.
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11 Introduction
Peer eﬀects are at the heart of many recent debates on educational reforms.1 The
critical importance to both parents and policy makers of peer group distribution in
school is indisputable. Given the existence of peer eﬀects, deﬁned here as the eﬀect on
an individual’s academic performance of the ability distribution of her peers, govern-
ments should keep them in mind when planning how best to meet their educational
policy objectives. One situation in which peer eﬀects must be carefully considered
is when governments choose whether to stream (track) or mix students of diﬀering
abilities within public schools.
This paper analyzes, in a theoretical context, whether tracking or mixing students
by ability is optimal. It contributes to this debate by addressing three main questions.
First, it asks which system maximizes average human capital at the compulsory level.
Second, it explores whether the overall pop u l a t i o nc a nb es a i dt op r e f e ro n eo ft h e
aforementioned systems-tracking and mixing- over the other. Finally, it considers how
the existence of a positive dependence between parental background and individual
ability aﬀects the two previous issues.
While the inﬂuence of peers ability on one’s educational achievement is well doc-
umented, some relevant issues of this relationship are still being debated.2 Recently,
Hoxby (2000), Ammermueller and Piscke (2006), Ding and Lehrer (2007) and Kang
(2007) ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant peer eﬀects in achievement. While most studies fo-
cus on average innate ability within the classroom as the peer-based factor that most
strongly impacts on individual achievement, Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) ﬁnd that
students are inﬂuenced by students who are similar to them. Finally, there is also
evidence regarding the existence of non-linearities. Among others, Ding and Lehrer
(2007) suggest that clever students beneﬁtm o r ef r o mh a v i n gc l e v e rm a t e st h a nw e a k
students do.
The peer group quality aﬀects student achievement positively. However, raising
peer quality for every student is an impossible task. From a policy point of view,
the more relevant questions are concerned with eﬃciency issues: for whom does the
1See, for example, the 2006 NBER Fall Reporter.
2See Manski (1993) for details on the diﬃculties in identifying empirically peer eﬀects.
2peer group matter most? Do clever students or weak students proﬁtm o r ef r o mb e i n g
confronted with clever peers? To address these issues I introduce a model in which
students diﬀer in parental background as well as pre-school achievement. Wealthier
individuals have more resources to invest in their kids. In addition wealthier individ-
uals are more educated and care more about education which positively inﬂuences
their children’s achievement upon entering school.3 T h u s ,i nm ym o d e l ,t h et w oc h a r -
acteristics that deﬁne the individual, family background and pre-school achievement,
will be positively correlated as well. The production of human capital depends on
both students’ previous achievement and peer group characteristics. The degree of
complementarity between both inputs is shown to be a critical issue in the comparison
between tracking and mixing.
When comparing both educational systems, traditional methods focus on mean
impacts. However, modern welfare economics emphasizes the importance of account-
ing for the impact of public policies on distributions of outcomes. My paper advances
this literature beyond computing the average achievement under tracking and mix-
ing to derive the distribution of achievement under each educational systems and
compare them according to several criteria.
I ﬁnd that, tracking is the system that maximizes average human capital in soci-
eties where the distribution of pre-school achievement is not very dispersed. In this
case, the complementarity between peer eﬀects and pre-school achievement drives
the result. As some sources of heterogeneity among individuals appear and societies
become more dispersed, for example because the pre-school achievement gap between
rich and poor students increases, the complementarity eﬀect dilutes: the beneﬁts of
the high-achievers do not compensate the losses of the lower-achievers and tracking
might not be the system that maximizes average human capital. Then, mixing might
maximizes average human capital in this case. I also ﬁnd that the system that max-
imizes average human capital depends on the level of complementarity between the
peer eﬀect and individuals’ innate ability. In particular, when peer eﬀects matter
more for low (high) ability students than for high (low) ability students, average hu-
man capital is maximized under mixing (tracking), which is the system where low
(high) ability students enjoy a stronger peer eﬀect.
3The importance of child investment at early ages has been emphasized by Heckman (2006).
3Finally my study suggest that, among risk averse individuals the preference for
mixing versus tracking depends on the degree of complementarity between the peer
eﬀect and individuals’ pre-school achievement. If they are nearly complementary,
then there is no unanimously preferred system in the population. However, if they
are close substitutes, it is mixing the system unanimously preferred in the population.
In other words, when peer eﬀects matter more for low achievers, then the distribution
of human capital under mixing is less “spread” and thus can be considered less risky
than the distribution of human capital under tracking.
There are several papers related to this. Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002) study
the eﬀects of ability grouping on school competition. They examine the consequences
of tracking for the allocation of students of diﬀering abilities and income within and
between public schools. De Bartolome (1990) proposes a community model where
public-service output depends on input expenditures, on own personal characteristics,
and on the peer group eﬀect. He shows that communities may become heterogeneous
in composition and (second-best) ineﬃcient and that this equilibrium occurs when the
peer group eﬀect is neither “too strong” nor “too weak”. Arnott and Rowse (1987) is
the paper most related to this one. They analyze the optimal allocation of students
and resources when peer eﬀects are present by focusing on the degree of concavity
of the peer group eﬀect. However, they fail to consider the existence of a positive
dependence between family background and individuals’ characteristics and its role
in the process of human capital accumulation which is one of the main focus of this
paper. They conclude that, when the objective is to maximize mean performance,
the optimal allocation of students abilities depends on the properties of the educa-
tion production function. However they also admit that the (narrow) focus on the
degree of concavity of the peer group eﬀects prevents them from seeing the possible
dependence of individual welfare on the whole shape of human capital distribution in
the population. In this paper, and in line with the most recent empirical evidence, I
assume concavity in peer eﬀects and discuss how the complementarity between peer
characteristics and individuals’ characteristics (a point for which the empirical ev-
idence is still quite mixed) can determine which system maximizes average human
capital. In addition to this, my approach contributes to the relevant literature by
comparing both systems in terms of the induced distributions of human capital at
4the end of compulsory school.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
the main features of human capital distribution under the two education systems
at compulsory school level. Section 3 compares the induced distributions of human
capital in these two systems. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Individuals
Population size is 1. Individuals diﬀer in two aspects: their family background and
their pre-school achievement, θ0 where θ0 ∈ [0,1]. To make the model tractable, I
assume that family background takes only two values, that is, individuals can have
either poor or rich parents with probabilities 1 − λ and λ, respectively.4 Id e n o t eb y
gb(θ0) the p.d.f. (probability distribution function) of θ0 conditional on having family
background b, where b = p,r for poor and rich parents respectively. To capture the
possibility that some level of positive dependence exists between parental background
and pre-school achievement, I assume that gp(θ0)=γθ
γ−1
0 and gr(θ0)=1 , where
γ ∈ (0,1]. In Figure 1 I represent in dotted line the C.D.F. of θ0 f o rb o t hp o o r( i n
black) and rich individuals (in grey) and in solid black line the C.D.F. of θ0 for the
whole population when γ<1.
Here Figure 1 (The distribution of pre-school achievement)






0 + λθ0 if θ0 ≤ 1
1 if θ0 > 1.
(1)
That is, the conditional mean of pre-school achievement depends on parental back-
ground. The lower is γ, the higher is the gap in pre-school achievement between
poor and rich people. In addition, from (1) we have that pre-school achievement
4Alternatively we could interpret the two parent types as black or white, natives or immigrants,
etc.











which is strictly decreasing with γ and λ. That is, as either the pre-school achievement
gap or the proportion of poor students decreases the distribution of pre-school achieve-
ment becomes less dispersed. Below we analyze the eﬀect of pre-school achievement
dispersion on the average human capital under both education systems.
Individuals accumulate human capital by attending compulsory education, which
is free of charge, and they are not allowed to work.
2.2 Production of Human Capital
At compulsory level individuals are separated into diﬀerent groups or classes. To
simplify, I consider only two groups. The production of human capital depends on
two factors. The ﬁrst is the individual’s pre-school achievement, θ0. The second is
the “peer group” eﬀect that depends on the characteristics of the group in which the
individual is placed. These characteristics are summarized by the mean achievement
of the group j or “peer” eﬀect, denoted by θ
j
0 . After attending compulsory education,
an individual with pre-school achievement θ0 ends up with a level of human capital
θ1.5
I assume that the production of human capital is a CES of the two inputs, θ0 and
θ
j
0. The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between individuals’ ability
and peer group eﬀect is still mixed. Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) cannot reject the
hypothesis according to which high and low-achieving students beneﬁt equally from
the presence of high achieving students. However, Ding and Lehrer (2007) ﬁnd that
high-ability students beneﬁt more from having higher-achieving schoolmates than
students of lower ability. Thus, I select the following functional form in the analysis
in order to study how the complementarity between peers’ eﬀect and individuals’
5See, among others, Bishop (2006), Epple and Romano (1998), Epple, Romano and Sieg (2003)
and Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002) who also assume that peers aﬀect an individual through the
mean of their characteristics.











where A>1, ρ ∈ [0,1] and β ∈ (0,1].T h ep a r a m e t e rρ captures the weight of pre-
school achievement on θ1.T h eﬁnal level of human capital θ1,i sat w i c ed i ﬀerentiable,
increasing and concave function. That is, on the one hand the positive impact of an
increase in mean achievement is decreasing, this resulting in an eﬃciency loss from
tracking.6 On the other hand, Equation (3) allows for the possibility that θ
j
0 and θ0
are either complements or substitutes, since β determines the elasticity of substitution




> 0,t h a t
is, high-achievers beneﬁt most from an increase in mean achievement, which implies
that there would be an eﬃciency gain from tracking.7 Therefore, Equation (3) clearly
sets up a tension between mixing and tracking.8
Finally, note that Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) ﬁnd that the peer eﬀect depends on
students’ characteristics. In particular they provide some support for a speciﬁcation
in which homogeneity is good, that is, every student learns the most when he or
she is with students like him or her(see also Manski and Wise (1983)). In this sense,
Equation (3) captures the main features of peer eﬀects on weak students’ achievement
found by Hoxby and Weingarth (2006). As long as β<1, since weak students are
closer to the mean within the group than very weak students, the impact of peers
is higher for the former than for the latter. Although (3) does not capture the
peer impact found by Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) regarding good and very good
students, observe that, in general, weak students seem to be the main concern of
recent education reforms.9 F i n a l l yn o t et h a tt h i sp r o - h o m o g e n i t ys p e c i ﬁcation would
underlie support for tracking. However, even by ruling this possibility out to some
6The empirical evidence suggests that the peer group eﬀect is non-linear: the achievement level
of students rises with an improvement in the average quality of their classroom, but this positive
eﬀect has decreasing returns (see Ding and Lehrer (2007) and Hoxby and Weingarth (2006)).
7In particular, for β close to 0,b o t hθ
j
0 and θ0 have some level of complementarity and as β tends
to 1 the two factors become perfect substitutes.
8See also Benabou (1996) who, in a model of local public ﬁnance and community formation,
analyzes this general trade-oﬀ between complementarity and curvature.
9This is clearly the objective that underlies some recent educational policies in the US as for
example, the No Child Left Behind Act.
7degree, and as we will see below, I get that tracking performs better that mixing
in most of cases. Thus, such a speciﬁcation would only reinforce my main results
without adding additional insight.
2.3 Education Systems at Compulsory Level
In this section I describe the two polar education systems of mixing and tracking and
analyze the distribution of human capital at the end of compulsory school under each
system.
2.3.1 Mixing
Under mixing, the pre-school achievement distribution is the same in both classrooms.
The average pre-school achievement within each classroom, denoted θ
m
0 ,c o i n c i d e s
with the average pre-school achievement in the population:
θ
m









It can be checked that the average pre-school achievement is increasing with λ
the proportion of rich individuals and also with γ, that is, it is decreasing with the
pre-school achievement gap. In addition θ0
m
(γ,λ) ≤ 1/2 for any γ and λ.
Under mixing, θ1 will lie in the support [m,m] where m and m denote the level of
human capital θ1 acquired under mixing by the “worst” (lowest pre-school achiever)
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8It can be checked that, ceteris paribus, if in society A parameter γ is higher
than in society B, then the distribution of human capital under mixing FM(θ1) in B
will be dominated by the one in A. This is because average pre-school achievement
θ
m
0 (γ,λ) (which is higher in A than in B) is the only determinant of the diﬀerence
i nh u m a nc a p i t a lb e t w e e nb o t hs o c i e t i e s . I no t h e rw o r d s ,i fi nAt h eg a pi np r e -
school achievement is lower than in B, because A implements more eﬀective policies
in reducing it at early educational stages than B, then the distribution of human
capital under mixing FM(θ1) in A dominates the one in B.
As shown in Figure 2 below, an increase in γ implies an increase in the expected
value of θ1 under mixing. Here, the case γ =1 /4 is represented in solid line and
γ =3 /4 in dashed line:
Here Figure 2 (The distribution of θ1 under Mixing)
























and fM(θ1) denotes the p.d.f (probability distribution function) of θ1 under mixing.
From (8) and Figure 2 it can be checked that EM(θ1) is an increasing function of
λ,t h ew e a l t hl e v e li nt h ep o p u l a t i o n ,a n do fγ, as we saw above.
2.3.2 Tracking
Tracking students implies grouping them on the basis of pre-school achievement. For
the sake of simplicity I permit only two tracks and I use the median level of pre-school
achievement as a threshold for grouping students into one track or the other. Thus, a
student is assigned to the high (low) track when his/her pre-school achievement θ0 is
a b o v e( b e l o w )t h em e d i a n ,d e n o t e db yη(γ,λ).T h u s ,η(γ,λ) is such that G(η)=1 /2.
9From Figure 1 we see that the median η(γ,λ) is increasing in λ and γ.I n a d -
dition, note that the distribution of pre-school achievement θ0 is right-skewed, that
is η(γ,λ) < θ
m
0 (γ,λ) for any λ ∈ (0,1) and γ ∈ (0,1].T h u s ,η(γ,λ) ≤ 1/2 for any
λ ∈ (0,1) and γ ∈ (0,1] implies that the number of rich students in the high track
will be higher than the number of rich students in the population. This captures the
empirical evidence found by Brunello and Checchi (2007) among others regarding the
socioeconomic composition of the diﬀerent tracks.




0 the average pre-school achievement in the low and high
track, respectively. Thus, given the distributional assumptions on θ0,Ih a v et h a t :
θ
l














































It can be checked from (9) and (10) that the average pre-school achievement in
both the low and the high track is increasing with the median level of pre-school




0(γ,λ) will increase as γ increases.
In other words, as the pre-school achievement gap between rich and poor students
decreases, the average human capital increases in both the low and the high track.
In the low track, θ1 lies within the interval [l,l].W ed e n o t eb yl and l the human
capital θ1 acquired in the low track by the “worst” (lowest pre-school achiever) and











Likewise, in the high track, θ1 lies within the interval [h,h].W ed e n o t eb yh and
h the human capital θ1 acquired in the high track by the “worst” (lowest pre-school
10achiever) and the “best” (highest pre-school achiever) individual, respectively, that
is.:
h(γ,λ)=A(ρη










It can be checked from (12) and (13) above that the support of θ1 in the low track
does not overlap the support of θ1 in the high track, that is, h(γ,λ) > l(γ,λ) for
every λ ∈ (0,1) and γ ∈ (0,1).
The C.D.F. of θ1 under tracking, denoted by FT(θ1),i s :
FT(θ1)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨





0) if l ≤ θ1 ≤ l





0) if h ≤ θ1 ≤ h
















for j = l,h.
As under mixing, and ceteris paribus, if in society A the level of γ is higher than
in society B, then the distribution of human capital under tracking FT(θ1) in A will
dominate the one in B. Figure 3 represents the case γ =1 /4 in solid line and γ =3 /4
in dashed line:
Here Figure 3 (The distribution of θ1 under Tracking)
The intuition of the previous result is as follows. As the value η(γ,λ) is higher
in A than in B, from (9) and (10) we have that the average pre-school achievement
in both the low track, θ
l
0,a n dt h eh i g ht r a c k ,θ
h
0, will also be higher in A than in
B. This ensures that the human capital acquired by the students is higher in both
tracks. Consequently, as can be checked from (15) and Figure 3, FT(θ1) will be lower
in A than in B.
11We can conclude that, similar to mixing, if A spends more resources than B on
early childhood education then, under tracking, the distribution of human capital in
B is dominated by that in A.








where fT(θ1) denotes the p.d.f (probability distribution function) of θ1 under tracking.
Again, the expected value of θ1 under tracking is increasing in both λ and γ.
3 A comparison of mixing and tracking
First I consider that the educational system is chosen by majority voting and that
every individual votes for the system under which her ﬁnal level of human capital
θ1 is higher. In this case, exactly half of the population will prefer mixing (those
with θ0 <η ), since under tracking they would be placed into the low track, where
they would enjoy a lower peer eﬀect. The other half will prefer tracking (those with
θ0 >η ), since they would be placed into the high track, where they would enjoy a
higher peer eﬀect. We see that 1
2 prefers mixing and 1
2 prefers tracking, which means
that no system will defeat the other under a majority voting rule.
Second, I consider the government wants to maximize the utility of the worst-oﬀ
individuals in the society, as might be suggested by some recent education policies in
the US, as the No Child Left Behind Act cited above. To do this we have to deﬁne
ﬁrst who are the worst-oﬀ in our model. If, for example, we take as the worst-oﬀ those
with pre-school achievement below the median level and with poor parents, the result
is quite immediate. Mixing is always better. This comes directly from the properties
of the human capital production function (Equation (3)), since maximizing the utility
of these individuals will imply to maximize their human capital at compulsory level.10
Finally I consider that individuals choose the education system behind the so-
called “veil of ignorance”. That is, they choose between societies without knowing
10Note that this applies to all the individuals with θ0 <η (γ,λ), except for that individual with
θ0 =0 .
12where they will be placed or what characteristics they will have in each society. The
idea of choosing from behind a veil of ignorance, to reﬂect fairness of societies, has
proved very useful in theoretical economics (see the seminal works of Harsanyi (1953
and 1955) and Rawls (1971) and more recently Cremer and Pestieau (1998)) and in
empirical (see Johansson-Stenman et al (2002) and Carlsson et al (2003) among oth-
ers).11 A possible implication of this approach is that, individuals when choosing from
behind the veil of ignorance would choose the alternative that maximizes expected
utility or, equivalently they would unanimously agree on the alternative that maxi-
mizes a utilitarian welfare function (see Harsanyi (1953)). In my model, to choose an
education system from behind the veil of ignorance implies that individuals ignore
both the value of θ0 that they will end up enjoying and their parents’ background.12
One possibility is just to compare the two systems in terms of average human
capital. This is like assuming that all individuals are risk neutral behind the veil
of ignorance. I present now and discuss the results regarding this comparison using
numerical simulations. The most important result is that the diﬀerence between
average human capital under the two systems, ET(θ1) − EM(θ1), decreases with β.
The following table presents the value of β, for some values of both γ and λ, such
that ET(θ1) − EM(θ1)=0 ,d e n o t e di tb yb β(γ,λ).T h u s ,f o rβ below (above) b β(γ,λ)
we have that ET(θ1) − EM(θ1) > (<)0:13
11Johansson-Stenman et al (2002) and Carlsson et al (2003) analyze the individuals’ choice be-
tween alternative societies with diﬀerent income distributions behind a veil of ignorance. In both
experiments they instructed the respondents to consider the well-being of their imaginary grandchild,
that is, to choose the alternative that would be in the interest of their grandchild.
12Note that, since η(γ,λ) < 1/2, if individuals knew theirs parents’ background they would also
knew at which track they would be assigned to with higher probability under tracking.
13The Coleman Report as well as recent works (see for example Heckman (2006) and references
therein) show that families and not schools are the major sources of inequality in school performance,
this implying that ρ should be high enough. Finally note that, for example, γ =0 .25 means that the
mean pre-school achievement within the poor represents the 40% of the mean pre-school achievement
within the rich.
13Table 1. Average Human Capital: b β(γ,λ) a
Pre-school achievement gap: γ
λ 0 . 20 . 2 50 . 30 . 3 5 0 . 4
1/5 0.930 0.960 0.979 0.992 0.999
1/4 0.931 0.965 0.982 0.996 1
1/3 0.950 0.980 0.997 1 1
aNote that here A=2 and ρ=3/4.
(17)
We can conclude that as long as β is not very large, i.e., when θ
j
0 and θ0 have
some level of complementarity, then average human capital is always maximized under
tracking. When β is close to 1, meaning that the two factors are close substitutes,
average human capital is maximized under mixing. To put it diﬀerently, when peer
eﬀects matter more for low (high) ability students than for high (low) ability students,
average human capital is maximized under mixing (tracking), which is the system
where low (high) ability students enjoy a stronger peer eﬀect.
The second lesson we can extract from Table 1 is that as the level of dispersion
in pre-school achievement decreases, measured by either an increase in γ or λ (see
Equation (2)), tracking maximizes average human capital for a larger interval of
values of β.I n f a c t i f e i t h e r γ or λ are suﬃciently high then tracking maximizes
average human capital for every β ∈ (0,1].O b s e r v e t h a t , i f e i t h e r γ =1or λ =
1 then, from (1) we have that G(θ0)=θ0. That is, the pre-school achievement
distribution is uniform and the same for both income groups. In this case, it can be
checked that ET(θ1) − EM(θ1) > 0 for any ρ and β ∈ (0,1]. Clearly, what drives
the previous result is the complementarity between the peer group eﬀect and the
pre-school achievement level. However, as either γ or λ falls below 1, the dispersion
in the pre-school achievement distribution increases and the complementarity eﬀects
dilutes. Note that the pre-school achievement distribution of rich students does not
change with either γ or λ. As a result, the increased dispersion is a result of either a
decrease in the mean pre-school achievement of poor individuals or just an increase
in the proportion of poor individuals, whose mean pre-school achievement is lower
14than that of rich students. Under tracking therefore, those placed in the high track
still beneﬁt but their gains might not always compensate the losses of those placed in
the low track. As a result, mixing might maximizes average human capital in those
cases.
Figure 4 below represents combinations (γ,λ) giving rise to the same value of b β.
Recall that b β(γ,λ) is the level of complementarity between peer group eﬀects and
individual pre-school achievement such that the average human capital under both
systems coincides. As it can be checked from Table 1, b β(γ,λ) is increasing with
both γ and λ. In other words, as society becomes less dispersed in terms of the
pre-school achievement distribution, because either the diﬀerence in mean pre-school
achievement between rich and poor or the proportion of poor individuals decreases,
then b β(γ,λ) increases. That is, it is required a higher level of sustitutability between
peer group eﬀects and individual pre-school achievement, to get mixing as the system
that maximizes average human capital.
Here Figure 4 (Average Human Capital)
The general message we can extract from Table 1 and Figure 4 is that tracking is
the system that maximizes average human capital in societies where the pre-school
achievement is not dispersed. As some sources of dispersion in pre-school achievement
appear, because either the gap between poor and rich students or the proportion of
poor students increases, then mixing might be better than tracking in maximizing
average human capital. This result contrasts to that of Kremer and Maski (1996),
where they ﬁnd that increases in skill-dispersion promote segregation of workers by
skill. However, note that they do not consider the existence of peer eﬀects which
is a crucial input in explaining the role of skill dispersion on the optimal alloca-
tion of individuals with diﬀerent skill levels. As I have shown above, less dispersion
reinforces the complementarity eﬀect between individuals’ initial achievement and
the peer eﬀect which, in turn, induces segregation among individuals. By contrast,
more dispersion dilutes the aforementioned complementarity eﬀect and thus induces
integration among individuals.
A last possibility, which has not been previously considered in the literature, is
to compare both systems in terms of the whole distribution of human capital. Recall
15that if the distribution of human capital under a given system dominates that of
another according to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, then all individuals can be
said to prefer the former over the latter.14
However, it can be checked that neither system dominates the other according to
this criterion.
Proposition 1 Fr(θ1) ²FOSD Fs(θ1) for r,s = M,T and r 6= s for any γ,β and ρ.
Proof. (i) FT(θ1) ²FOSD FM(θ1).U s i n gFT(θ1) from (15) and FM(θ1) from (7) we
can check that, for any θ1 ∈ (0,l], (FT(θ1) − FM(θ1)) > 0 for every λ,γ,β and ρ.
(ii) FM(θ1) ²FOSD FT(θ1). Using Equations (15) and (7), we can check that for any
θ1 ∈ [h,h], (FT(θ1) − FM(θ1)) < 0 for every λ,γ,β and ρ.
Figure 5 illustrates the previous result, where FM(θ1) and FT(θ1) are represented
in solid and dashed lines respectively. Therefore we can conclude that, regardless of
the properties pertaining to the process of human capital accumulation, there is no
unanimity in the population so as to which system to choose.
Here Figure 5 (No First Order Stochastic Dominance)
Finally, I will consider that all individuals behind the “veil of ignorance” are risk
averse. In this case, they will prefer the less risky distribution of human capital.
This criterion leads to the concept of second order stochastic dominance. It can be
checked that the preferred system according to this criteria depends on the degree of
complementarity between the peer group eﬀect and pre-school achievement, β.15
14Recall that it is implicitly assumed here that individuals maximize expected utility that depends
on human capital.
15Note that Proposition 2 holds if and only if FM and FT cross only once, which is true from
Proposition 1.
16Proposition 2 The preferred system according to second order stochastic dominance
depends on β as follows:
(i) If β<b β then neither system dominates the other.
(ii) If β>b β then mixing dominates tracking.
Proof. F i r s tn o t et h a tFT(θ1) ²SOSD FM(θ1). Using FT(θ1) from (16) and FM(θ1)
f r o m( 7 )w ec a nc h e c kt h a t ,
l Z
0
(FT(θ1) − FM(θ1))dθ1 > 0, for every ρ and γ.N o w
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FM(θ1)dθ1. Finally note that,
if FM(θ1) ºSOSD FT(θ1), then the following inequality should hold: h − EM(θ1) ≤
h − ET(θ1). The ﬁnal result is immediate from Table 1 and Table 2.
This proposition says that when peer eﬀects and pre-school achievement are close
substitutes, all averse individuals prefer mixing. That is, when peer eﬀects matter
more for low achievers than for high achievers individuals then the distribution of
human capital under mixing is less “spread” and thus can be considered less risky
than the distribution of human capital under tracking.
Finally note that b β(γ,λ) is increasing with γ,ρ and λ.T h a ti s ,f o re x a m p l e ,a s
a society becomes more equal in terms of pre-school achievement between poor and
rich individuals, then it is required a higher level of sustitutability between peer eﬀect
and pre-school achievement in the production of human capital, to get mixing as the
preferred system. In other words, as the government implements policies to reduce
the gap in pre-school achievement, mixing will be less and less preferred to tracking.
174 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have analyzed public intervention in education when the government,
taking into account the existence of peer eﬀects, has to decide how to group students.
Ih a v ec o n s i d e r e dt w od i ﬀerent education systems: tracking and mixing.
A number of previous works have studied the optimal education system by fo-
cusing on mean achievement. This paper contributes to this line of research by
recognizing the existence of a positive dependence between family background and
individuals’ pre-school achievement and its eﬀect on each of the two educational sys-
tems described above. In addition to that, this paper contributes to this literature by
comparing the distribution of human capital under each educational system according
to several criteria.
The main result of the paper is that tracking is the education system that maxi-
mizes average human capital in societies where the distribution of pre-achievement is
not very dispersed. As some sources of heterogeneity among individuals appear and
societies become more dispersed, for example because the pre-school achievement gap
between rich and poor students increases, then mixing becomes the education system
that maximizes average human capital.
I have showed that, among risk averse individuals, the preference for mixing versus
tracking depends on the degree of complementarity between peer eﬀects and individ-
uals’ characteristics. If they are nearly complements then there is no preferred system
in the population. However, if they are close substitutes then mixing is the system
unanimously preferred.
This paper allows for some extensions. An important one is the introduction
of prices which are omitted in this paper under the assumption of free education
in both systems. It would be interesting to consider them in the model. It might
also be important to relax some of the assumptions presented here. For example,
we might consider other distributions of innate ability or introduce the possibility
of tracking students only within a certain subset of subjects as in Epple, Newlon
and Romano (2002). In addition to adding realism, incorporating this possibility
would make it easier to design an optimal educational system. On the other hand, it
would be interesting to explore how the education system introduced at compulsory
18level, either tracking or mixing, can inﬂuence students decisions as whether to attend
college or not (see Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2005) for a similar analysis with a more stylized
model).
Finally I think that the results presented here are relevant for several recent de-
bates in the literature of economics of education. There is increasing evidence that
shows the early emergence and persistence of gaps in cognitive and non-cognitive
skills (see among others, Carneiro and Heckman (2003)). Studies that highlight the
importance of increasing expenditure in early childhood care in pursuing both eﬃ-
ciency and equity provide an interesting illustration. As I have showed in this paper,
a government, while reducing the gap in pre-school achievement between rich and
poor students, should also choose very carefully the way of grouping them in order to
maximize average human capital or to ﬁnd the preferred education system in the pop-
ulation. Another example is the literature that looks at the heterogeneity in grouping
policies across countries and tries to explain it (see Brunello et al (2005) and Ariga
et al (2005) among others). As Brunello et al (2005) pointed out, eﬃciency consid-
erations are not enough in explaining the existing diﬀerences that instead might be
driven by some distributional concerns of society.
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Figure 5: No First Order Stochastic Dominance  